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Unspeakably Cruel — Torture, Medical Ethics, and the Law
George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H.
Torture is a particularly horrible crime, and any participation of physicians in torture has always been
difficult to comprehend. As General Telford Taylor
explained to the American judges at the trial of the
Nazi doctors in Nuremberg, Germany (called the
“Doctors’ Trial”), “To kill, to maim, and to torture
is criminal under all modern systems of law . . .
yet these [physician] defendants, all of whom were
fully able to comprehend the nature of their acts
. . . are responsible for wholesale murder and unspeakably cruel tortures.”1 Taylor told the judges
that it was the obligation of the United States “to all
peoples of the world to show why and how these
things happened,” with the goal of trying to prevent a repetition in the future. The Nazi doctors defended themselves primarily by arguing that they
were engaged in necessary wartime medical research and were following the orders of their superiors.2 These defenses were rejected because they
are at odds with the Nuremberg Principles, articulated a year earlier, at the conclusion of the multinational war crimes trial in 1946, that there are
crimes against humanity (such as torture), that individuals can be held to be criminally responsible
for committing them, and that obeying orders is no
defense.2
Almost 60 years later, the question of torture during wartime, and the role of physicians in torture,
is again a source of consternation and controversy.
Steven Miles, for example, relying primarily on government documents, has noted that at the prisons
at Abu Ghraib, Iraq, and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
“at the operational level, medical personnel evaluated detainees for interrogation, and monitored
coercive interrogation, allowed interrogator to
use medical records to develop interrogations approaches, falsified medical records and death certificates, and failed to provide basic health care.”3
The Red Cross, on the basis of an inspection of
Guantanamo in June 2004, alleged that the physical and mental coercion of prisoners there is “tantamount to torture” and specifically labeled the
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active role of physicians in interrogations as “a flagrant violation of medical ethics.”4
Bloche and Marks have reported, on the basis of
their interviews with some of the physicians involved in interrogations at Guantanamo Bay and
in Iraq, that the physicians believed “that physicians serving in these roles do not act as physicians
and are therefore not bound by patient-oriented
ethics.”5 Psychiatrist Robert Jay Lifton has suggested that the reports of U.S. physicians’ involvement
in torture from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo echo those of the Nazi doctors who were “the
most extreme example of doctors becoming socialized to atrocity.”6 Nonetheless, the muting of the
criticism of such torture prompted Elie Wiesel to
ask why the “shameful torture to which Muslim
prisoners were subjected by American soldiers [has
not] been condemned by legal professionals and
military doctors alike.”7
The United States has grown accustomed to setting the standard for the world in condemning torture as always criminal and always an inexcusable
violation of human rights. It was therefore disturbing to watch the new U.S. attorney general, Alberto
Gonzales, try to defend the administration’s policies
on torture in the wake of the attacks on September
11, 2001, at a Senate panel hearing on his nomination this past January. The first question Gonzales
was asked by Chairman Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) was,
“Do you approve of torture?” Gonzales replied, “Absolutely not, Senator.”8 Two weeks later, the new
secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, pointedly refused to characterize forced nudity and simulated
drowning as techniques of torture, insisting instead
that “the determination of whether interrogation
techniques are consistent with international obligations and American law [is] made by the Justice Department.”9 Until September 11, the United States
had always and unequivocally condemned torture
and those who engage in it, but since U.S. law on
torture appears to be obscure to our highest officials
charged with enforcing it, it is well worth reviewing.
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torture
In 1994, the United States ratified the international
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and
followed that by enacting specific laws against torture. Even before this, Congress had passed the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991. As the Supreme
Court stated in 2004, this act provides “authority
that ‘establishes an unambiguous and modern basis
for’ federal claims of torture and extrajudicial killing.”10 The act provides that any person (including
a noncitizen) can bring a civil action in U.S. courts
against any other person who “under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation” subjects a person to torture or extrajudicial
killing. “Torture” is defined there, as in the Convention against Torture, as
any act, directed against an individual in the
offender’s custody or physical control, by
which severe pain or suffering . . . whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted
on that individual for such purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third person
information or a confession, punishing that
individual for an act that individual or third
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, intimidating or coercing that
individual or a third person or for any reason
based on discrimination of any kind.11
Government-sanctioned torture is prohibited in
the United States by the 5th Amendment to the
Constitution (which has a prohibition against selfincrimination that was adopted specifically to prohibit the use of torture to extract confessions), the
8th Amendment (which prohibits “cruel and unusual punishment”), and the 14th Amendment.
Torture is also a crime under state criminal statutes prohibiting assault and battery. An additional federal statute, which also follows the Convention against Torture, makes it a crime for any person
“outside the United States” to commit or to attempt
to commit torture, which is defined for this purpose as “an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict
severe physical or mental pain or suffering . . .
upon another person within his custody or physical control.”12
This antitorture statute has recently been the
subject of conflicting interpretations from the Department of Justice. After September 11, Justice
2128
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Department lawyers argued (wrongly) that the president, as commander in chief, has the authority to
order the torture of prisoners and that, contrary to
the Nuremberg Principles, obeying such an order
is a valid defense against a charge of a war crime or
a crime against humanity.13 The August 1, 2002,
memorandum from the Justice Department to Alberto Gonzales, then legal counsel to the president,
also concluded that to constitute torture under the
statute, the pain inflicted “must be equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical
injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily
function, or even death.”13 This memorandum, in
which Justice Department lawyers acted more like
private attorneys advising their clients (in this case,
government officials) on how they might avoid prosecution under the antitorture statute (rather than
advising them to follow the law), has been widely
and rightly criticized. The Department of Justice
withdrew the memorandum shortly after it became
public in June 2004.14
One week before the hearing on the nomination
of Alberto Gonzales to the post of attorney general, on December 30, 2004, the Justice Department
issued a replacement memorandum that set forth
its new interpretation of the antitorture law, which
is much more consistent with the language of the
law and U.S. policy. This memorandum begins by
expressing the overriding theme of U.S. law on torture: “Torture is abhorrent both to American law
and values and to international norms. This universal repudiation of torture is reflected in our
criminal law . . . international agreements . . .
customary international law, centuries of AngloAmerican law, and the longstanding policy of the
United States, repeatedly and recently affirmed by
the President.”14 This is all to the good. Unfortunately, the memorandum also raises important issues of hypocrisy and secrecy, stating, in footnote
eight, that prior opinions — still secret — approving various interrogation techniques “for [use with]
detainees” are not affected by the replacement
memorandum. One such opinion, prepared for the
Central Intelligence Agency, is reported to authorize the use of 20 interrogation techniques, including “waterboarding,” in which a person is made to
believe he or she will drown.15
President Bush said on June 30, 2003, that “torture anywhere is an affront to human dignity everywhere,” and on July 5, 2004, that “America stands
against and will not tolerate torture. . . . Torture
is wrong no matter where it occurs, and the United
States will continue to lead the fight to eliminate it
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everywhere.”14 The challenge for the administration trict courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
— and for all of us — is to match actions to words. civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.” The question before the Court was
the rights of torture victims
whether, as the Ninth Circuit had ruled, this statute
Almost 25 years ago, William Curran devoted his gave U.S. district courts the legal authority to hear a
“Law–Medicine Notes” feature in the Journal to the case like that brought by Alvarez-Machain in which
subject of torture.16 He reported on what was then the plaintiff alleges a “violation of the law of naa unique case, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, in which the tions.”
The Court was unable to find any evidence that
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York ruled
that U.S. courts, under the Federal Alien Tort Stat- Congress in 1789 had specific violations of interute (also referred to as the Alien Tort Claims Act), national law in mind but supposed that the most
had jurisdiction to hear civil cases brought against likely ones were Blackstone’s “three primary oftorturers by noncitizens who were victims of that fenses: violation of safe conducts, infringement of
the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.” The Court
torture.17
The case involved a physician who brought suit then cited Filartiga as the beginning of “the modern
in the United States against the inspector general line of cases.” The Court concluded that federal
of police of Asunción, Paraguay, for the torture courts can determine just what the current “law of
and murder of his 17-year-old son. In his opinion nations” is but instructed courts to be conservative
upholding jurisdiction, Judge Irving R. Kaufman in determining what international law requires: “We
summarized universally accepted principles of in- think courts should require any claim based on the
ternational human rights law: “The torturer has present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of inbecome — like the pirate and the slave holder be- ternational character accepted by the civilized world
fore him — hostis humani generis, an enemy of all and defined with a specificity comparable to the
mankind.”17 Judge Kaufman and his court could feature of the 18th-century paradigms we have recmake law only for the Second Circuit, but in 2004, ognized [e.g., piracy].”10
the Supreme Court answered the question of the
In support of his position that his arbitrary dereach of the Alien Tort Statute for the entire coun- tention was a violation of international law, Alvareztry. The case involved Humberto Alvarez-Machain, Machain cited the Universal Declaration of Human
a Mexican physician.10
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Officials of the Drug Enforcement Administra- Political Rights. The Court found that the Universal
tion (DEA) believed that when one of their agents, Declaration did not have the force of law and that
Enrique Camarena-Salazar, was captured in 1985 “the United States ratified the Covenant on the exin Mexico, tortured over a two-day period, and then press understanding that it was not self-executing
murdered, Alvarez-Machain had been present and and so did not itself create obligations enforceable
had used his medical skills to extend the interroga- in the federal courts.”10 Treaties and custom are the
tion and the torture. Demonstrating how strongly primary sources of international law. After treaties
the U.S. government objected to physicians partic- had been rejected as support for Alvarez-Machain,
ipating in torture, the DEA in 1990 took the extraor- he was left to argue that arbitrary arrest and detendinary step of hiring Mexican nationals to kidnap tion, like piracy, had attained the status of “binding
Alvarez-Machain and bring him to the United States customary international law.” Given its reluctance
for trial. The kidnapping succeeded, but at trial to recognize new causes of action, it is not surprisAlvarez-Machain was found not guilty. After return- ing that the Court rejected Alvarez-Machain’s arguing to Mexico, Alvarez-Machain brought an action ment on the grounds that it “would support a cause
against the United States under the Alien Tort Stat- of action in federal court for any arrest, anywhere
ute, alleging false arrest and arbitrary detention. in the world, unauthorized by the law of the jurisAlvarez-Machain won at trial, and the Ninth Circuit diction in which it took place.”10 The case thus
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
stands for the proposition that a brief illegal detenIn an opinion written by Justice David Souter, tion is insufficient grounds for a claim in U.S.
the Supreme Court reversed the award. Nonethe- courts as a violation of international law.
less, this opinion determined the meaning and
The decision is more important for its statereach of the Alien Tort Statute, enacted by Con- ment that when acts are universally condemned by
gress in 1789, which states in its entirety: “The dis- international law, such as state-sanctioned piracy,
n engl j med 352;20

www.nejm.org

may 19, 2005

The New England Journal of Medicine
Downloaded from nejm.org at BOSTON UNIVERSITY on December 3, 2021. For personal use only. No other uses without permission.
Copyright © 2005 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved.

2129

The

new england journal

torture, and murder, they can be the basis for a lawsuit under the Alien Tort Statute. The decision reaffirms the long-standing view of the Supreme Court
that “the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of nations.”10,18 In a case alleging
torture, the Court would find torture a violation of
international law both because it is universally condemned in international law and because the Congress has ratified the Convention against Torture
and adopted a law authorizing individual lawsuits
to be brought by victims of torture. Thus, under the
Alien Tort Statute, the victims of torture at the prisons at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, for example, may bring a claim against their alleged torturers in U.S. courts — and it should be expected that
many will.

the geneva conventions
The road to torture at Abu Ghraib begins arguably
with the president’s decision in February 2002 that
the Geneva Conventions would not apply to “enemy combatants” jailed at Guantanamo Bay.19 This
decision was made over the strong objections of
then Secretary of State Colin Powell and without any
meaningful input from the career lawyers in the
armed services, all of whom objected to jettisoning
the Geneva Conventions, an international treaty
from which the United States had never before deviated. The reasons given for taking prisoners to
Guantanamo was that the global war on terror was
a “new kind of war” that made the Geneva Conventions inapplicable and that Guantanamo could and
should be used as an interrogation center for suspected terrorists that was outside the jurisdiction
and, thus, the oversight of U.S. courts.20,21
It seems to have been assumed that if neither
the Constitution nor international law applied in
Guantanamo Bay, the administration could write
its own rules of conduct for the prison, and it did.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, for example, specifically approved types of torture that could
be used in interrogations there, and he specifically
involved physicians in it by requiring that prisoners
have “medical clearance” before these techniques
were applied to them.22 In the words of Rumsfeld’s
directive, the new techniques can be used only after, among other things, “the detainee is medically
and operationally evaluated as suitable (considering all techniques to be used in combination).”22
These torture techniques made their way to Abu

2130

n engl j med 352;20

of

medicine

Ghraib when the commander of the prison at Guantanamo Bay, General Geoffrey Miller, was transferred to Iraq in 2004.23
According to the administration, the Geneva
Conventions were to apply in Iraq. Had they been
followed, the torture and abuse of prisoners at Abu
Ghraib would not have occurred. The conventions
not only prohibit torture and abusive and humiliating treatment of prisoners but also specifically protect physicians who follow medical ethics by reporting and refusing to participate in torture and
abuse of prisoners.24 The Independent Panel to Review Department of Defense Detention Operations
highlighted professional ethics as the core consideration in the prevention of torture and abuse, stating that “all personnel who may be engaged in detention operations, from point of capture to final
disposition, should participate in a professional
ethics program that would equip them with a sharp
moral compass for guidance in situations often riven with conflicting moral obligations.”25 With regard specifically to physicians, “the Panel notes that
the Fay investigation [by the Army] cited some medical personnel for failure to report detainee abuse.
As noted in that investigation, training should include the obligation to report any detainee abuse.”20
On June 28, 2004, the day before the Supreme
Court decided the Alien Tort Statute case, the Court
decided that under the statute, prisoners at Guantanamo could challenge their imprisonment in U.S.
courts as well as bring civil claims for injury and
abuse.26 The Court thus rejected the position of the
Bush administration, as stated in oral argument
before the Ninth Circuit, that even were the United
States engaged in “murder and torture” at Guantanamo, U.S. courts could not interfere. In another
case that was decided on the same day, the Supreme
Court ruled that a U.S. citizen who was captured on
the battlefield in Afghanistan and initially held at
Guantanamo before being transferred to the United States had the right to a fair hearing under the
Constitution to contest his status as an “enemy
combatant.”27 In this opinion, the Court cited provisions of Geneva Convention III (concerning prisoners of war) as authoritative on the “law of war.”27
More recently, a district court has ruled explicitly
that the Geneva Conventions must be followed at
Guantanamo.28 In all these cases, the judicial branch
of government has been much more articulate than
the executive branch in condemning torture and
upholding both U.S. and international law.
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international and medical ethics
As Telford Taylor argued at the Nuremberg Trials,
the prevention of crimes against humanity, including torture, must be our primary goal. Torture remains widely practiced around the world, even
though universally condemned. Amnesty International estimates that 150 countries currently practice torture. Torture is wrong under all circumstances, because it is cruel and degrading to humans and
an extreme violation of human rights under international law. Jean-Paul Sartre’s description of
torture, written almost 50 years ago during the
French–Algerian War, should resonate in the United
States after the attacks on September 11: “Torture
is senseless violence, born in fear.”29 Now that the
president has proclaimed that torture is always
wrong, we must return to the question of how to
prevent it effectively during wartime when a highlevel or low-level official believes that torture, although illegal, appears nonetheless to be likely to
aid the war effort.
Preventing torture is everyone’s business — but
three professions seem to be especially well suited
to prevent torture: medicine, law, and the military.
Each profession has particular obligations. Physicians have the obligations of the universally recognized and respected role of healers. Lawyers have the
obligations to respect and uphold the law, including
international humanitarian law. And military officers have the obligation to follow the international
laws of war, including the Geneva Conventions.
Americans need the blessings of both lawyers
and physicians to justify torture. Professor of law
Alan Dershowitz, for example, believes that we must
accept that torture will be used in extreme situations
and try to regularize its practice by requiring prior
judicial approval of its use and limiting it to the infliction of “nonlethal pain” — such as “shoving
a sterilized needle under the fingernail of a suspect.”30,31 Both Dershowitz and the Fox television
network’s hit program 24 glamorize torture by
portraying ticking-time-bomb scenarios in which
a captured terrorist knows where a bomb will soon
explode that will kill many innocent civilians.30 Of
course, medicalizing torture does not make it right
or effective — even in such a situation. International terrorists have already gone beyond such scenarios by combining the bomb and the terrorist into
a single entity, the suicide bomber.
The challenges of the war on terror present an
opportunity for medical and legal professional or-
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ganizations to work together transnationally to uphold medical ethics and international humanitarian
law, respectively, rather than to search for ways to
avoid legal or ethical dictates. In addition, the war
on terror provides physicians and lawyers who are
also military officers with an opportunity to clarify
their roles in the military services and their obligations under international law and the U.S. Uniform
Code of Military Justice.
Almost 30 years ago, Sagan and Jonsen observed
in the Journal that because the medical skills used
for healing can be maliciously perverted “with devastating effects on the spirit and the body,” it is “incumbent upon the medical profession and upon all
of its practitioners to protest in effective ways
against torture as an instrument of political control.”32 Such protest can help in the war against
terrorism. Neither the use of torture nor violations
of human rights, as another professor of law, the
Jesuit Robert Drinan, has observed, will “induce
other nations to follow the less traveled road that
leads to democracy and equality,” but the “mobilization of shame” and the “moral power” of example can do so.33 Torture begins by dehumanizing
the victim but ends by dehumanizing the torturer.
As Telford Taylor put it at Nuremberg, “A nation
that deliberately infects itself with poison will inevitably sicken and die.”1
From the Department of Health Law, Bioethics, and Human
Rights, Boston University School of Public Health, Boston.
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